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Abstract 
 
The current Argentine debt crises scenario is representative of a climate of financial irresponsibil-
ity that does not show signs of waning and has regretfully become a permanent feature of the in-
ternational financial landscape.  
 
This ongoing study examines the evolution of irresponsible borrowing and lending behavior. 
Through the development of interpretive graphical models, the study hopes to demonstrate the 
predictability of defaults and to help in the detection of their timing and magnitudes. The isolation 
of these two factors may assist the global financial community to develop strategies to forestall 
and/or soften the impacts associated with financial catastrophes of this type. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
he age-old adage that there are two certainties in life, that is, death and taxes, is in dire need of revi-
sion for the twenty-first century world of international finance. During much of the twentieth cen-
tury, the world financial community tried to create regulations, rules of conduct, codes of ethics, and 
institutional structures that would help assure stability and reliability for large-scale international financial transac-
tions and for financial relations among nations. The outcome of these efforts is lackluster in light of recurring global 
financial crises. 
 
The in progress default by the government of Argentina, for example, both on domestic debt and on large-
scale foreign debts is the most recent manifestation of predictable crises arising from incurring unsustainable finan-
cial obligations and from excessive hard currency borrowing. The availability of funds from various sources does 
not lead to substantial punitive consequences in the short-term. However, longer-term consequences of great severi-
ty eventually do result as the sources of income needed to service the rising debt fail to keep pace with the borrow-
ing activity. The occurrence of default situations is then predictable because their occurrence is inevitable. Nonethe-
less, their timing and magnitudes still remain uncertain and are important subjects for forecasting purposes. The cer-
tainty of debt defaults thus becomes the third guaranteed event – along with death and taxes.  
 
Borrowing Modalities after Default 
 
There are several ways that borrowers may obtain needed monies. Ideally, borrowers ought to anticipate 
their future needs for money and enter into debt obligations having well defined and predictable repayment sche-
dules. In this way, both lenders and borrowers can forecast future financing activities and achieve a measure of nor-
malcy and stability. However, failure by borrowers to anticipate fluctuations in their abilities to adhere to repayment 
schedules and to establish reserves to accommodate these variations can result in erratic borrowing behavior. When 
this happens, predictability is lost and a default condition may occur. 
 
_____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
T 
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After a default event, borrowers may obtain new loans, taking either an aggressive or a conservative ap-
proach, as identified in the patterns of Figure 1. Curve A in this illustration depicts a borrower who secures loans 
through a stepped up pace, often the result of attempts to stave off civil unrest or other catastrophes. When this oc-
curs, borrowing after the default resumes at a rapid or exaggerated rate. However, the borrower‟s (or the borrowing 
country‟s) problems may be so huge that a gigantic loan needs to be obtained, that is, borrowing escalates initially at 
a steep rate after which its increases dampen to a slower rate. 
 
Alternately, the borrowers may start with a cautionary approach in seeking monies, and then become more 
assertive with the size or frequency of loan agreements as the borrowers‟ abilities to demonstrate improved earnings 
conditions and enhanced reliability become evident. Curve B in Figure 1 illustrates this cautionary rate of borrow-
ing. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Resumption of Borrowing Alternatives 
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Lending Modalities after Default 
 
From the lender perspective, it may be desirable to expand lending at a constant rate to allow the borrower 
to gradually absorb the funds and expand the total magnitude of the loans in reaction to the borrower‟s improved 
ability to service debt, as presented in Figure 2. 
 
After a default, lenders may be weary of, or even afraid of resuming lending at what may be termed a 
„normal lending pattern‟. The lenders may adopt a cautious stance and, for a period, curtail the quantity of loaned 
funds until the borrowers have given reasons to the lenders to feel more confident or to conclude that the risks asso-
ciated with expanded lending have declined. Figure 3 describes this gradual or cautionary lending pattern. 
 
Nonetheless, in some instances, the needs of the borrower are so urgent that despite great apprehension of 
the providers of the funds, they may be willing to recommence lending at an accelerated rate. (Commercial lenders 
may not be willing to do this completely on their own and such lending may be organized using the joint efforts of 
private and governmental agencies working in collaboration with supranational organizations such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other development-oriented banking institutions.) This emergency or 
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expansionary lending pattern is exhibited in Figure 4 indicating that the growth of the resumed lending is most rapid 
immediately after the time of default.  
 
 
Figure 2 – Normal Lending Pattern 
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Figure 3 – Gradual or Cautionary Lending Pattern 
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Figure 4 – Emergency or Expansionary Lending Patten 
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Losses in Borrowing Opportunities Due to Default 
 
When defaults occur, the total amount of funds that can be borrowed by a country over a long period of 
time will be substantially smaller than the total amount that could have been borrowed in the same period, had a de-
fault event been avoided. Figure 5 isolates and identifies the components of the borrowing process.   
 
Line A describes a borrowing schedule under non-default (or pre-default) conditions. Line B depicts the 
schedule of resumed borrowing after a debt default event.  
 
The area represented by the large triangle (a, c, e) represents a normal and optimal agglomerated borrowing 
pattern wherein money inflows grow at a rate smaller or equal to the rate of economic growth, which makes support-
ing the servicing of the debt possible. In the cases of most industrialized countries, this triangle describes the de-
fault-free expansion of debt. Note that these countries may be aided in avoiding a default event by the automatic de-
valuation of their currencies by international capital markets and not by the actions, decisions, and policies of sove-
reign governments. These devaluations take place as a result of being members of the floating exchange rate system.  
 
The area bounded by points (a, b, d, a) defines the continuous inflow of funds, which the borrowing coun-
try is able to service because its economic resources are sufficient. The default point „b‟ identifies the instant of in-
terruption in borrowing, which may have been triggered by anomalies like a decline in the rate of economic growth, 
insufficient tax collection, political disruption, or aggressive manipulation by currency speculators.  
 
Immediately following the point of default, borrowing under normal conditions halts, drops toward zero, 
and then recommences under modified circumstances at point d. The area bounded by points (d, c, e, d) identifies 
post-default borrowing. The area bounded by points (b, c, d, b) delineates the magnitude of the funds that the bor-
rower could not obtain because it has committed a default.  
 
Therefore, instead of being able to obtain a total amount represented by the bounded area (a, c, e, a), it can 
only acquire the amount of funds represent by the total bounded area [(a, c, e, a) – (b, c, d, b)], which is also equal to 
the sum of the bounded areas [(a, b, d, a) + (d, c, e, d)]. 
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Figure 5 – Simple Macroeconomic Model of Borrowing Incorporating a Default Event 
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Line B is the post-default borrowing schedule
Bounded area (a, c, e, a) is optimal borrowing pattern
Bounded area (a, b, d, a) is pre-default borrowing pattern
Bounded area (d, c, e, d) is post-default borrowing pattern
Bounded area (b, c, d, b) is borrowing lost due to default event
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From Unworthy Borrower to Predatory Borrower and from Irresponsible Lender to Predatory Lender 
 
Some unworthy borrowers may simply borrow too much money and fall into the chasm of debt default. 
Hopefully, their problems can be resolved without catastrophic pain to the borrowers (or the borrowing country), 
through rescheduling of debt that is harmonious with prior debt restructuring efforts. However, some unworthy bor-
rowers deliberately build up debt over such a short period of time that the resulting enormous debt burdens make 
early debt defaults a certainty. These borrowers knowingly take the money and run, leaving others to cope with the 
crises created by the default. Such borrowers are the predatory borrowers. 
 
Similarly, irresponsible lenders do not exert the effort to appropriately ascertain the creditworthiness of 
clients, and expand lending carelessly until a default occurs, causing moderate to substantial losses to lending insti-
tutions. Hopefully, as in the case of unworthy borrowers, debt rescheduling curtails or limits the financial damages 
to the lending institutions. However, some irresponsible lenders are so aggressive in granting loans that they burden 
the borrowers with debt service obligations of such enormity that early default becomes a certainty. Here too, the 
lenders take the money and run because these lenders pocket the upfront fees and commissions associated with mak-
ing the loans, knowing all to well that soon someone else will have to deal with the financial crises they created for 
their own institutions. These lenders have evolved from irresponsible to predatory lenders. Figure 6 highlights the 
transitions from unworthy borrower behavior to predatory borrower behavior and from irresponsible lender behavior 
to predatory lender behavior.   
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Figure 6 – Patterns of Abusive Borrower and Lender Behavior 
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The Iron Triumvirate of Debt Default 
 
The numerous international debt defaults ranging from large to huge were caused by varied circumstances. 
However, in nearly all cases, the debt crises emerged from the activities as well as the in-activities of the three major 
participants in large-scale international borrowing and lending: the borrowers, the lenders, and the regulators who 
oversee financial transactions at the national and global levels. The debt crises arise because these three players who 
together make up an “iron triumvirate” exhibit behaviors which qualify them for the monikers – „unworthy borrow-
ers‟, „irresponsible lenders‟, and „incapable regulators‟.  
 
Unworthy borrowers are exemplified by those who aggressively increase their outstanding debt as much as 
they can without self-imposed limits. They expand the outstanding debt until the lenders are unwilling to extend ad-
ditional loans or until they inform the lending community of their inability or unwillingness to service debt.  
 
Irresponsible lenders are those institutions from both major and minor money capital exporting countries 
that are so driven to seek the short- to intermediate-term incomes made possible through international lending that 
they fail to prudently estimate the abilities of borrowers to service debt. These lenders may even fail to adequately 
take into account the historical behavior of important borrowers who in the past, with almost consistent periodicity, 
defaulted on their debt obligations.  
 
Incapable regulators are the individual nation-level regulators, central bankers, and supranational financial 
organizations - such as the IMF - whose charters typically encompass the proper oversight of the lending/borrowing 
activities of commercial institutions as well as developmental agencies. As such, the perception of their role by the 
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lending and borrowing community is that of a policing agent who should issue warnings whenever excessive or oth-
erwise imprudent activity occurs. Moreover, the trust and general good faith instilled in these organizations is often 
so strong as to allow a false sense of security to permeate not only the lending and borrowing communities but also 
the individuals and companies whose funds are deposited into the coffers of the lending institutions. All too often it 
is these same depositors (and the taxpayers) who find themselves in the unenviable position of having to carry the 
burdens of the after affects of debt defaults because they held the false illusion that the oversight provided by the 
regulators would prevent the default events.  
 
Conclusion and Prediction 
 
The behavior of the borrower or lender part of the iron triumvirate may also manifest itself in various de-
grees of extremeness. Although problems can be caused by any one of these three groups, the associated difficulties 
are likely to be manageable. Modifications in corporate practices, government programs, and/or national policies 
may be necessary in order to forestall the arrival of major financial disruptions, as demonstrated by the circular areas 
A or B or C in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 – Degrees of Financial Chaos Caused by the Iron Triumvirate 
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The interaction of two of these disruptive forces may lead to a more problematic scenario where the urgent 
counter-measures must be more dramatic and include such remedial measures as debt rescheduling and the coopera-
tion of lenders with borrowers as well as with the legislators of the country involved, as illustrated by the shaded 
areas 1 or 2 or 3. 
 
However, the simultaneous interaction of all three forces results in the near collapse of the financial stabili-
ty of the borrowing institution or country. In this case, as indicated by shaded area 4, even cooperative approaches 
by all three groups may not be sufficient to avoid enormous economic dislocations or societal chaos. When this con-
gruence of forces becomes manifest, then it can be predicted that the dislocations would be very severe and the re-
medial measures might take years to implement and that neither the unworthy borrowers nor the incapable lenders 
will be able to avoid incurring enormous losses.    
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